Reporting incentives, ownership concentration by the largest outside shareholder, and reported goodwill impairment losses
Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 3, 199-214
This paper examines the determinants of reported goodwill impairment losses by Malaysian listed companies from 2006 to 2010. The results show managers' reporting incentives are significantly associated with the reported impairment losses. The results also show that the effect of “big bath” reporting on the reported impairment losses was moderated by the largest outside shareholder ownership concentration. Further analyses reveal that “big bath” reporting is not found in companies with a controlling outside shareholder. These findings suggest that increased ownership by the largest outside shareholder is associated with increased shareholder monitoring of the managers' “big bath” reporting.
Keywords: Largest outside shareholder; Goodwill impairment; Accounting discretion; Ownership concentration; Emerging economy; Mandatory accounting change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jocaae:v:11:y:2015:i:3:p:199-214
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Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics is currently edited by Agnes C.S. Cheng, P. Clarkson, F.A. Gul, Zoltan Matolcsy, Dan Simunic and Ben Srinidhi
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