The consignment mechanism in carbon markets: A laboratory investigation
Noah Dormady and
Paul J. Healy
Journal of Commodity Markets, 2019, vol. 14, issue C, 51-65
Unlike other auction-based carbon emission markets, California's carbon market (AB32) utilizes a consignment auction design in which utilities are allocated a share of emissions permits that they must sell into the uniform-price auction. Auction revenue is returned to the consignee, which creates an incentive to increase the auction clearing price through strategic bidding. In a numerical example, we identify the incentive that consignees have to overstate their quantity demanded in the auction, since this increases the probability that the auction clears at a higher price. This results in inefficient allocations and inflated auction prices. We test this effect through a series of laboratory experiments and confirm these predictions. Findings indicate that short-run firm profits are lower in a consignment auction than in a non-consignment auction market, and that firms are more likely to not receive the quantity of permits they need for program compliance in the auction. We conclude with implications for the design and modification of future Coasian markets.
Keywords: Emissions markets; Auctions; Energy markets; Energy policy; Environmental policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C91 D44 D82 Q40 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jocoma:v:14:y:2019:i:c:p:51-65
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Commodity Markets is currently edited by Marcel Prokopczuk, Betty Simkins and Sjur Westgaard
More articles in Journal of Commodity Markets from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().