Regionalization of Latin America based on asymmetries in the absorptive capacity of countries
Germán Héctor González,
Juan David García-González,
José Santiago Gómez-Medina and
Virginia Inés Corbella
The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 2023, vol. 27, issue C
Abstract:
Latin America has a rich history of regional integration agreements with no sustained success. One possible explanation is that these agreements mainly depend on political considerations and do not have a solid basis at the level of private agents. Opposite to the previous literature on regionalism, a method founded on asymmetric economies is proposed in this work. Based on the identification of sources and manifestations of asymmetries, a club clustering proposal of countries is provided. The study involves 67 variables, 20 countries from Latin America, and a period between 1985 and 2008. The results reveal that the existing agreements are not based on the countries' asymmetries, then, the achievement of a successful continental integration is unlikely under the current circumstances.
Keywords: Regionalism; Integration agreements; Asymmetries; Convergence clubs; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F10 F14 F42 O24 P33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joecas:v:27:y:2023:i:c:s1703494923000038
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeca.2023.e00291
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