Closing the gender negotiation gap: The power of entitlements
Elif Demiral,
Macie Addley and
Erin Taylor
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2025, vol. 106, issue C
Abstract:
Women are less likely to negotiate for their labor market outcomes than men and this finding is linked to the gender gaps in economic outcomes. Through a wage negotiation experiment, we investigate how entitlements influence gender differences in negotiation likelihood. We manipulate the formation of entitlements by employing different hiring methods. Our results reveal that when the hiring process is based on luck (random treatment), men are more prone to negotiate than women. In the condition where the hiring process lacks transparency (unknown treatment), the gender gap declines and remains muted. When the hiring process is transparently grounded on merit (entitlement treatment), women react by displaying higher negotiation likelihood, and the gender gap in negotiation not only declines but reverses in direction. These findings underscore the potential of transparent and merit-based recruitment practices in mitigating gender disparities within labor market outcomes.
Keywords: Gender; Negotiation; Entitlements; Labor; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D9 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:106:y:2025:i:c:s0167487024000941
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2024.102786
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