Do individuals recognize cascade behavior of others? - An experimental study

Tim Grebe, Julia Schmid and Andreas Stiehler

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2008, vol. 29, issue 2, 197-209

Abstract: In an information cascade experiment participants are confronted with artificial predecessors predicting in line with the BHW model (Bikchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100, 992-1026). We study participants' probability perceptions based on maximum prices for participating in the prediction game. We find increasing maximum prices the more coinciding predictions of predecessors are observed, regardless of whether additional information is revealed by these predictions. Individual price patterns of more than two thirds of the participants indicate that cascade behavior of predecessors is not recognized.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:29:y:2008:i:2:p:197-209

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