Inducing efficient conditional cooperation patterns in public goods games, an experimental investigation

Pablo Guillen, Enrique Fatas () and Pablo Brañas-Garza

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2010, vol. 31, issue 6, 872-883

Abstract: This study analyses the behavior in a repeated public goods game when subjects know about the possibility of existence of strict conditional cooperators. We employed a baseline treatment and a threat treatment in which subjects are informed about the possibility of being in a group together with automata playing a grim trigger strategy. We conjecture the resulting game allows for almost fully efficient outcomes. Contributions in the threat treatment increase by 40% before a surprise restart, and by 50% after the surprise restart. In line with the grim trigger strategy subjects contribute either all or nothing in the threat treatment.

Keywords: Social; dilemmas; Conditional; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Inducing a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Public Goods Games (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:872-883

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