Strategy versus sincerity in mean voting

Carla Marchese () and Marcello Montefiori

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2011, vol. 32, issue 1, 93-102

Abstract: This paper focuses on the mean vote procedure for choosing the quantity of a public good, a social choice rule that selects the mean of the quantities voted for. The available theoretical models of mean voting give rise to conflicting predictions about the extent of the strategic bias that might arise in the individual vote. An experiment has been run in order to assess whether the participants disclose their (induced) preferences in voting or whether they strategically manipulate their vote, and in the latter case, which variables impact upon the likelihood of strategic bias and to what extent.

Keywords: Experiment; Voting; rule; Public; good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:1:p:93-102

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