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Pay to walk away: Prevention buyers prefer to avoid negotiation

Shaul Shalvi, Gaby Reijseger, Michel J.J. Handgraaf, Kirstin C. Appelt, Femke S. ten Velden, Mauro Giacomantonio and Carsten K.W. De Dreu

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2013, vol. 38, issue C, 40-49

Abstract: In bargaining, buyers aim to spend as little money as they can on the items they seek to purchase. Compared to promotion-oriented people, prevention-oriented people seek to avoid losses rather than to secure gains. Employing different negotiation scenarios, three lab experiments tested the prediction that prevention-oriented buyers would thus display higher negotiation aversion than promotion-oriented buyers. Results showed that prevention-oriented people in the role of a potential buyer were willing to accept lower monetary compensation to refrain from entering the negotiation and were more likely to exit the negotiation when such an opportunity was presented to them. We discuss these findings and their contribution to our understanding of how regulatory focus influences consumers’ economic decisions.

Keywords: Negotiation; Regulatory focus; Endowment effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:38:y:2013:i:c:p:40-49

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.03.002

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