Citizenship and power in an agent-based model of tax compliance with public expenditure
Paolo Pellizzari () and
Dino Rizzi ()
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, vol. 40, issue C, 35-48
In this paper we present a model of tax compliance with heterogeneous agents who maximize their individual utility based on income and the conjectured level of per capita public expenditure. We formally include psychological drivers in this model. These drivers affect individual behavior, such as risk aversion, together with appreciation of public expenditure, expectations about peers’ compliance and a natural inclination to comply, all of which we summarize in a quality termed “citizenship”. The enforcement system, based on random inspections, is standard and only partially known to agents.
Keywords: Tax evasion; Public expenditure; Agent-based models; Slippery slope model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H26 H40 C63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Citizenship and Power in an Agent-based Model of Tax Compliance with Public Expenditure (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:40:y:2014:i:c:p:35-48
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