Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study

Israel Waichman (), Till Requate () and Siang, Ch’ng Kean

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, vol. 42, issue C, 1-16

Abstract: This study investigates the impact of communication on outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized-communication’ and a ‘free-communication’ device. Using both students and managers as subjects, we find that managers behave in a similar way under both communication devices, while students collude slightly better under free than under standardized communication. Second, while under standardized communication managers select lower outputs than students, we observe no difference in subject pools under free communication. Finally, we observe more collusion in duopoly than in triopoly.

Keywords: Economic experiment; Cournot oligopoly; Subject-pool effects; Managers; Communication; Cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D21 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:1-16

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2014.02.005

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