 Team versus individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination gameAnanish Chaudhuri (), Tirnud Paichayontvijit and Tony So Journal of Economic Psychology, 2015, vol. 47, issue C, 85-102 Abstract: We compare coordination success of individuals and teams in the minimum effort coordination game. The game is played by groups of either five individuals or five two-person teams with either fixed or random re-matching protocols. When groups are fixed, teams perform at least as well as individuals, if not better, in terms of coordinating to the payoff dominant outcome. But with random re-matching, teams experience pervasive coordination failures. A public recommendation to a strategy or a performance bonus exhorting players to coordinate to the payoff-dominant equilibrium has similar impact on coordination for both individuals and teams playing with fixed matching. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with teams playing under random re-matching. Our results have implications for the design of work-groups in organizations. Keywords: Weak-link games; Coordination; Teams; Recommendation; Performance bonus (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:47:y:2015:i:c:p:85-102 DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.02.002 Access Statistics for this article Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier |
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