Group payoffs as public signals

Christos Ioannou, Shi Qi and Aldo Rustichini

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2015, vol. 48, issue C, 89-105

Abstract: We study experimentally the effect on individual behavior of comparative, but payoff-irrelevant, information in a near-minimal group setting. Specifically, in each round, group members see the groups’ cumulative payoffs, which consist of an aggregation of the earnings of each member of the group in the round. Our novel experimental design incorporates two games (the Trust game and the Dictator game) whose payoffs are carefully chosen to ensure cross-game comparability. In the baseline, no comparative information is displayed; the sessions are otherwise identical.

Keywords: Trust game; Dictator game; Group identity; Public signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C72 C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:48:y:2015:i:c:p:89-105

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2015.03.003

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