Logical abilities and behavior in strategic-form games
Ralph-C Bayer () and
Journal of Economic Psychology, 2016, vol. 56, issue C, 39-59
This paper investigates the impact of cognitive abilities and preferences on behavior in games. We first measure subjects’ logical abilities and social preferences and then evaluate their influence on behavior in strategic-form games. For this purpose, we estimate how logical abilities and preferences relate to the probability of a subject being of a specific behavioral type. We find that better logical abilities increase the likelihood of sophisticated behavior. This shift is stronger for subjects who are classified as “selfish”. However, not even the most logically able, selfish subjects are identified as Nash types.
Keywords: Logical ability; Behaviors; Strategic-form games; Experiments; Preferences; Sophistication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:56:y:2016:i:c:p:39-59
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