Honesty or dishonesty of taxpayer communications in an enforcement regime

James Alm (), David Bruner and Michael McKee

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2016, vol. 56, issue C, 85-96

Abstract: In many settings the true likelihood of capture when engaging in an illegal activity, such as tax evasion, is not well known to an individual. “Official” statements from the tax administration regarding enforcement effort provide some information. In addition, “informal”, or “unofficial”, communication among taxpayers can supplement these official announcements, but individuals do not know with certainty whether such unofficial information is honest (or accurate) versus dishonest (or inaccurate). We examine the truthfulness of an individual’s revelation of unofficial information to other individuals, along with the factors that affect any revelation, focusing on the intrinsic motivations for revelations. Our experimental design allows us to examine the type and the honesty of messages that an individual chooses to send to other individuals regarding their own audit outcome and their own compliance behavior. Our results indicate that most individuals send accurate messages about their own audit outcomes and their own compliance behaviors. Nevertheless, many individuals are also systematically dishonest about being audited; that is, we observe a significant tendency for individuals to claim that they were audited when they were not. We also observe a strong interaction between individuals’ audit outcomes and their compliance behaviors, so that individuals who engaged in tax evasion and who were audited were more truthful in their communications than those whose tax evasion went undetected.

Keywords: Tax compliance; Tax audits; Information; Honesty; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H2 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487016303099
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Honesty or Dishonesty of Taxpayer Communications in an Enforcement Regime (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:56:y:2016:i:c:p:85-96

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2016.06.001

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read

More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().