The evolution of awareness

Simon Grant and John Quiggin

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2017, vol. 63, issue C, 86-92

Abstract: We consider an evolutionary approach to how awareness is determined in games where players are not necessarily aware of all possible strategies. We begin with the standard notion of evolutionarily stable equilibrium, in which potential players pursue a fixed strategy. This constitutes a minimal level of awareness, since players are not required to know anything about the game or to reason about their opponents. We then consider the introduction of players with greater awareness.

Keywords: Unawareness; Bounded rationality; Evolutionarily stable equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:63:y:2017:i:c:p:86-92

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2017.01.010

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