Economics at your fingertips  

Voluntary contributions of time: Time-based incentives in a linear public goods game

Justine Jouxtel

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2019, vol. 75, issue PA

Abstract: This paper presents the findings of an experimental study designed to investigate whether the pattern of contributions elicited in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM) replicates the stylized facts reported in the literature when participants’ time, rather than their money, is at stake. In this experiment, participants are all confronted to the same incentive structure. For half of them, the game is materialized using monetary payoffs, as is done in standard VCM studies. For the other half, the returns from the private and public accounts are implemented as reductions in waiting time. Experimental procedures are designed to keep the decision domain, the size of incentives and the degree of confidentiality constant across the two resources. The contribution patterns elicited by both treatments are found to be (i) remarkably similar and (ii) in line with the picture typically drawn in the literature. Group contributions are statistically indistinguishable in terms of average, variability and distribution, in virtually all rounds of the game. Although I do find a significant difference in the decay rate of contributions across rounds, seemingly driven by a greater proportion of early free-riders and late full contributors in the Time Treatment, this effect is both small in magnitude and inconsequential in terms of game efficiency. Overall, the stylized facts often presented in the VCM literature seem to be robust to a change in operationalization of the incentive structure.

Keywords: Time; Incentive; Experiment; Public good; Voluntary contribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2019.01.002

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read

More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().

Page updated 2020-07-08
Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:75:y:2019:i:pa:s0167487018303350