Demonstrability, difficulty and persuasion: An experimental study of advice taking

Robert Hoffmann (), Thomas Chesney, Swee-Hoon Chuah, Florian Kock and Jeremy Larner

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2020, vol. 76, issue C

Abstract: Self-interested paid advisors should try to sell their solutions no matter how they came about. However, we present evidence that advisor persuasiveness depends on two dimensions of their prior problem solving: solution difficulty and demonstrability. We report a laboratory experiment with repeated advisor-client interactions where both these dimensions are independently varied. Persuasion rises in solution demonstrability and falls in difficulty. The reason is non-optimising behaviour: Advisors lacking in confidence fail to conceal difficult problem solving and those receiving their advice baulk when the proposed solution lacks objective success criteria irrespective of its promise. Our findings suggest differential prospects for persuasion and selling of different kinds of products, services and ideas.

Keywords: Persuasion; Advisors; Experiment; Demonstrability; Lying cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:76:y:2020:i:c:s0167487019302958

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2019.102215

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