Gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information

Samreen Malik, Benedikt Mihm, Maximilian Mihm and Florian Timme

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2021, vol. 86, issue C

Abstract: We conduct an experiment on gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information. Based on Abreu and Gul (2000), we introduce asymmetric information about commitments by inducing irrational types, who never back down from a fixed bargaining position. Bargaining behavior depends on whether gender is revealed or not. When gender is unknown, men are more likely to mimic irrational types than women, but this gender gap is eliminated when gender is known. Male-male pairs also experience longer delays than other pairs, but only when gender is revealed and only in pairs where one subject mimics the irrational type.

Keywords: Bargaining; Gender; Asymmetric information; Strategic posture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:86:y:2021:i:c:s0167487021000507

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102415

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