Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: An experiment

Anna Merkel and Christoph Vanberg

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2023, vol. 95, issue C

Abstract: We experimentally investigate the effects of subjective claims in a multilateral bargaining game. Claims are induced by having subjects ‘produce’ the surplus to be divided by earning points in a quiz task. We use a Baron–Ferejohn framework. Our main treatment variable is the majority required to pass a proposal. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal split and a division that is proportional to points earned in the productive task. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided using majority rule, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions in the presence of claims from production.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; Claims; Fairness; Majority rule; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 C92 D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:95:y:2023:i:c:s0167487023000028

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102601

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