Concord and contention in a dynamic unstructured bargaining experiment with costly conflict

Lian Xue, Stefania Sitzia and Theodore L. Turocy

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2023, vol. 97, issue C

Abstract: We report experimental results from a dynamic real-time bargaining experiment. Players earn flows of income from the assets they possess at any point in the bargaining process, while they incur costs which are proportional to the size of the conflict between players’ current claims. We find that most bargaining interactions are characterised by small but non-zero amounts of contention, which arises from the process of tacitly coordinating claims, including from negotiating turn-taking approaches. Interactions with large losses from contention occur in a sizeable minority of interactions. There are significant individual differences in outcomes across participants. We do not find systematic gender effects, but do find that the locus of control of participants predicts bargaining outcomes.

Keywords: Unstructured bargaining; Continuous time; Locus of control; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:97:y:2023:i:c:s0167487023000326

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2023.102631

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