Operation strategies for nanostore in community group buying
Shuxing Sun and
Bin Zhang
Omega, 2022, vol. 110, issue C
Abstract:
Nanostore operations are gaining prominence in the community group buying industry. Motivated by this development, we use a stylized game-theoretical model to investigate the conditions under which the nanostore prefers different operations strategies, such as the competitive strategy, cooperative strategy, and co-opetitive strategy. Our analysis shows that a nanostore's preferred operations strategy depends on the combined market parameters. While the nanostore prefers the competitive strategy and the co-opetitive strategy in many scenarios, it prefers the cooperative strategy in a few cases. Interestingly, we show that the nanostore has more incentives to prefer the competitive (co-opetitive) strategy when the production cost of the supplier is relatively high (low). We find that the preferred operations strategy of a nanostore does not necessarily benefit the supplier and the consumers, which may lead to channel conflict. Our results underscore the important role played by a nanostore's operations strategy and provide decision-makers with managerial insights for the community group buying industry.
Keywords: Community group buying; Nanostore; Competitive strategy; Cooperative strategy; Co-opetitive strategy; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2022.102636
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