Alliance strategy in an online retailing supply chain: Motivation, choice, and equilibrium

Tong-Yuan Wang, Zhen-Song Chen, Peng He, Kannan Govindan and Miroslaw J. Skibniewski

Omega, 2023, vol. 115, issue C

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the alliance strategy in an Online Retailing Supply Chain (ORSC). Three alliance models in addition to one no alliance model is built and examined. The no alliance model as a benchmark is developed to characterize the alliance motivation for each supply chain member. Afterwards, we identify the optimal alliance strategy and the final alliance equilibrium. The results show that the manufacturer always has motivations to form an alliance with each of other two members, while the retailer and the platform may form an alliance only when the agency rate is relatively low. Moreover, under certain conditions, all supply chain members could achieve a win-win-win result in the manufacturer-retailer and manufacturer-platform alliance models, but fall into a lose-lose-lose situation in the retailer-platform alliance model. Additionally, it is interesting that a higher agency rate makes the retailer more profitable when the platform and manufacturer enter into an alliance. Finally, we find that each of the three alliance models may be the final equilibrium, which is largely dependent on channel competition and the agency rate.

Keywords: Agency selling; Reselling; Alliance strategy; Online retailing; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048322001979
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jomega:v:115:y:2023:i:c:s0305048322001979

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional
https://shop.elsevie ... _01_ooc_1&version=01

DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2022.102791

Access Statistics for this article

Omega is currently edited by B. Lev

More articles in Omega from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().