Playing Stackelberg Security Games in perfect formulations

Pamela Bustamante-Faúndez, Víctor Bucarey L., Martine Labbé, Vladimir Marianov and Fernando Ordoñez

Omega, 2024, vol. 126, issue C

Abstract: Protecting critical infrastructure from intentional damage requires foreseeing the strategies of possible attackers. We formulate this problem as a Stackelberg Security Game. A defender must decide which specific targets to protect with limited resources, thus maximizing their expected utility (e.g., minimizing damage value) and considering that a second player (or players), called an attacker, responds in the best possible way.

Keywords: OR in defense; Bilevel optimization; Polyhedral structure; Stackelberg Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2024.103068

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