Rent seeking implications for salary increments in academe

Justin D Stolen and John M Gleason

Omega, 1984, vol. 12, issue 5, 485-488

Abstract: In many environments, salary increments consist of two parts: an 'across the board' component and a 'merit' component. These increments are usually funded from a wages pool which rarely bears any relationship to overall increases in productivity. The resulting competition for limited monies results in two forms of behavior: productive and predatory (or rent seeking). This paper develops a model which considers institutionally controllable variables and their influence on these behaviors in an academic environment. It is found that an increase in a wages fund will not necessarily lead to an increase in either total or productive faculty effort.

Date: 1984
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