The incentive fallacy in cooperative arrangements: A case study

To Baardsen and K Grønhaug

Omega, 1990, vol. 18, issue 5, 541-548

Abstract: The question "Why do cooperative arrangements fail?" represents the point of departure for the research reported in this paper. Common characteristics of such arrangements and the underlying mode of governance are discussed. A specific case of failure in cooperation (joint venture) is described and analyzed by using the introduced perspective. Managerial and theoretical implications are highlighted.

Keywords: cooperative; arrangements; mode; of; governance; incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1990
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