 Coherence and calibration in expert probability judgementF. Bolger and G Wright Omega, 1993, vol. 21, issue 6, 629-644 Abstract: Many decision-aiding technologies require valid probability judgements to be elicited from domain experts. But how valid are experts' probability judgements? It is of considerable practical importance to identify the conditions which affect the quality of these judgments. Descriptive psychological models permit the identification of situations in which judgement is likely to be poor, and suggest methods by which judgement may be improved. We describe two approaches to the assessment of the quality of probability judgement--calibration and coherence--and review research findings following from these two approaches. This review is carried out within a framework of the psychological processes required to make a probability judgement. Three rival psychological models of probability judgement are located within this framework, and are evaluated in the light of the empirical findings. We conclude that none of these three models is unequivocally supported by the empirical data. We suggest that this may be the case because the models, experimental tasks and measurement techniques are not sophisticated enough. We make some specific proposals for the resolution of these problems. Keywords: expertise; subjective; probability; judgement; and; decision; making; training; decision; support (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jomega:v:21:y:1993:i:6:p:629-644 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Omega is currently edited by B. Lev More articles in Omega from Elsevier |
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