Portfolio selection for managerial control

Yakov Amihud and A Barnea

Omega, 1974, vol. 2, issue 6, 775-783

Abstract: The paper formulates a decision problem where stocks are purchased to maximize the voting power of the portfolio. The statistic representing the voting power is derived from game theoretic solutions namely the "Shapley Value". The tradeoff between the variance of the portfolio returns and the value of the voting power statistic is explicitly considered.

Date: 1974
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