# Extending the bargaining approach to DEA target setting

*S. Lozano*,
*M.A. Hinojosa* and
*A.M. Mármol*

*Omega*, 2019, vol. 85, issue C, 94-102

**Abstract:**
This paper extends the approach based on bargaining for computing DEA targets. Thus, for each inefficient Decision Making Unit (DMU), a bargaining problem is defined where the players are the input and output variables that can be improved. In the case of the output players, their utility is an increasing linear function of the corresponding variable. The utility of input players is a decreasing linear function of the input. The disagreement point corresponds to the input and output utilities of the DMU being projected. We show how various well-known bargaining solutions, such as Nash bargaining solution, lexicographic Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, lexicographic egalitarian solution and normalized utilitarian solution, lead to corresponding DEA bargaining models. Some properties of the DEA bargaining models are derived as a consequence of those of the corresponding bargaining solutions. The proposed approach is validated using a container shipping lines application.

**Keywords:** Bargaining problem; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai–Smorodinsky solution; Egalitarian solution; Utilitarian solution; DEA; Target setting (search for similar items in EconPapers)

**Date:** 2019

**References:** View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc

**Citations:** Track citations by RSS feed

**Downloads:** (external link)

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305048317312677

Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

**Related works:**

This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

**Export reference:** BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text

**Persistent link:** https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jomega:v:85:y:2019:i:c:p:94-102

**Ordering information:** This journal article can be ordered from

http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/supportfaq.cws_home/regional

https://shop.elsevie ... _01_ooc_1&version=01

Access Statistics for this article

Omega is currently edited by *B. Lev*

More articles in Omega from Elsevier

Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().