Two-echelon lot-sizing with asymmetric information and continuous type space

R.B.O. Kerkkamp, Wilco van den Heuvel and A.P.M. Wagelmans

Omega, 2019, vol. 87, issue C, 158-176

Abstract: We analyse a two-echelon discrete lot-sizing problem with a supplier and a retailer under information asymmetry. We assume that all cost parameters are time independent and that the retailer has single-dimensional continuous private information, namely either his setup cost or his holding cost. The supplier uses mechanism design to determine a menu of contracts that minimises his expected costs, where each contract specifies the retailer’s procurement plan and a side payment to the retailer. There is no restriction on the number of contracts in the menu.

Keywords: Discrete lot-sizing; Mechanism design; Asymmetric information; Combinatorial optimisation; Polynomial-time algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Two-Echelon Lot-Sizing with Asymmetric Information and Continuous Type Space (2018)
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DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2018.09.001

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