Manufacturer encroachment with advertising

Jianqiang Zhang, Qingning Cao and Xiuli He

Omega, 2020, vol. 91, issue C

Abstract: This paper studies manufacturer encroachment in a supply chain wherein the manufacturer and/or the retailer should invest in informative advertising. Using a game-theoretic framework, we explore three schemes of advertising and their influences on manufacturer encroachment. First, if the manufacturer controls advertising, encroachment will result in higher advertising intensity relative to the non-encroachment case, sometimes leading to a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and the retailer as the boosted demand flows into the wholesale market under encroachment. Second, if the retailer controls advertising, an encroaching manufacturer should further reduce the wholesale price as compared to the counterpart with no advertising. This downward pressure on wholesale price can benefit the retailer, but might hurt the encroaching manufacturer. Third, we incorporate manufacturer advertising and retailer advertising into a cooperative advertising scheme, where the manufacturer can set a participation rate to adjust the advertising cost for the retailer. Interestingly, an encroaching manufacturer will pay the retailer more to subsidize his advertising cost. Under this scheme, the manufacturer is always better off under encroachment, and the retailer can also gain as a result of advertising cost-sharing from the manufacturer. Our results also apply to the case of persuasive advertising. Although persuasive advertising leads to different prices or advertising decisions, there are always chances for the retailer to benefit from manufacturer encroachment.

Keywords: Manufacturer encroachment; Informative advertising; Persuasive advertising; Cooperative advertising; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2018.12.002

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