Promotional pricing and online business model choice in the presence of retail competition

Pingping Chen, Ruiqing Zhao, Yingchen Yan and Xiang Li

Omega, 2020, vol. 94, issue C

Abstract: Online promotional channels provided by competitive conventional reselling or novel agency selling e-tailers are widely used by firms to stimulate significant sales in retail. Compared with reselling, agency selling gives firms the power to directly control prices, but it involves costly platform fees. Given the unique features of the reselling and agency selling business models, we develop game theoretic models to explore how the firm and e-tailers, under consideration of retail competition, should strategically use these two business models in promotion. Our analysis generates several insights. We demonstrate that the agency selling model might lead to a higher price than the reselling model, a result contrary to the double marginalization. We also present that without retail competition, there exists a “win-win” promotional strategy, which is also a Pareto-optimal situation for the firm and e-tailer. Specifically, this situation occurs when the e-tailer is in the reselling model under a moderate inventory level or in the agency selling model with a moderate platform fee under a high inventory level. However, under conditions of competitive e-tailers, both e-tailers being in the reselling model is no longer a “win-win” promotional strategy, while the hybrid selling model, i.e., one in the reselling model and the other in the agency selling model, can generate a Pareto improvement. In addition, low platform fees, customers’ high price sensitivities, increased selling costs or decreased competitive intensities will drive supply chain participants to seek direct pricing power in the agency selling model.

Keywords: Multistage retailing; Pricing; Business model; Retail competition; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2019.07.001

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