Penalizing passenger’s transfer time in computing airlines revenue

Julio B. Clempner

Omega, 2020, vol. 97, issue C

Abstract: Airline strategic alliances result in a form of cooperation where firms can access the resources of others network members in order to create added value for their passengers. The shortcoming of this process is that each member of the network makes individual revenue management decisions to maximize its own income, resulting in a sub-optimal income for the network members.

Keywords: Transfer pricing; Airlines; Alliances; Continuous-time; Markov chains; Cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2019.08.006

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