A Stackelberg-game approach to support the design of logistic terminals
Mario Catalano and
Marco Migliore
Journal of Transport Geography, 2014, vol. 41, issue C, 63-73
Abstract:
This paper deals with the design of logistic terminals taking Sicily, in the South of Italy, as a case study. It focuses on consolidation terminals for truckers and addresses the problem of optimising location pattern and public share in investments. This problem is solved through a Stackelberg game between the designer and the collective of road carriers. So a bilevel approach combines a system-optimum problem, at the upper level, with the carrier equilibrium problem, at the lower level. The choice behaviour of the lower-level player is simulated by a random utility model. The output of the game suggests that private companies and society should share the investments and the public contribution should be high; furthermore, transhipment and consolidation services should be concentrated at few terminals to exploit fully economies of scale at the expense of the average travel time to reach the logistic platforms.
Keywords: Logistic terminal design; Load factor optimisation; Public share in investment; Bilevel noncooperative game; Discrete location model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jotrge:v:41:y:2014:i:c:p:63-73
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtrangeo.2014.08.010
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