Illicit exploitation of natural resources: The forest concessions in Brazil

Onil Banerjee and Janaki Alavalapati

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2010, vol. 32, issue 4, 488-504

Abstract: The Brazilian forest sector has undergone crisis with complexities involved in investment in an insecure political environment, a regime of ambiguous property rights, forest sector illegality and enormous pressure for agricultural expansion. To address these challenges, Brazil's Public Forest Management Law was approved in 2006 enabling private forest management on public forestland. Assessing the policy in a dynamic computable general equilibrium framework, we find that household welfare improves and legal forestry grows faster. In the absence of improved monitoring and enforcement, however, forest concessions are shown to have a depressing effect on the price of forestland and accelerate illegal forestry operations.

Keywords: Brazilian; forest; sector; Forest; concessions; Forestland; Illegal; forestry; operations; Legal; forestry; Computable; general; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0161-8938(10)00048-7
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:32:y::i:4:p:488-504

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Policy Modeling is currently edited by A. M. Costa

More articles in Journal of Policy Modeling from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().