The effects of uncertainty about countries’ compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact

Montserrat Ferré

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2012, vol. 34, issue 5, 660-674

Abstract: The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to govern discretionary fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. This article studies the effects created when there is uncertainty about the members’ commitment to respecting the established deficit limits in the SGP. We will show that, even if countries respect the SGP deficit ceiling, the presence of uncertainty about their compliance will bring about higher volatility in key economic variables, which could, in turn, affect unemployment and growth negatively. This finding shows that it is important to reduce uncertainty about the members’ commitment towards the SGP.

Keywords: Fiscal policy rules; Monetary union; Stability and Growth Pact; Uncertainty; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E63 F55 H62 H87 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:34:y:2012:i:5:p:660-674

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.12.005

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