Stabilize the peasant economy: Governance of foreclosure by the shogunate
Yu Mandai and
Masaki Nakabayashi ()
Journal of Policy Modeling, 2018, vol. 40, issue 2, 305-327
Regulation of foreclosure in a financial crisis has been a centuries-long conundrum to authorities. Japan in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had free financial, land and coercive labor markets. It raised the growth but resulted in recurrent financial crises. Therefore, the Edo shogunate, 1600–1868, banned coercive labor, protected peasants’ property right and regulated the farmland-collateral loans. Seeking an appropriate degree of regulation, the shogunate first banned foreclosure and invited a credit shrink. Then the shogunate introduced legislation to legalize foreclosure of pledged farmland as clarifying the rights of borrowers. The regulation asymmetrically lowered interest rates for timely repayment.
Keywords: Farmland-collateral loans; Farmland foreclosure; Free labor; Peasant ownership; Early modern Japan (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 G18 K11 K12 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Stabilize the Peasant Economy: Governance of Foreclosure by the Shogunate (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:40:y:2018:i:2:p:305-327
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Policy Modeling is currently edited by A. M. Costa
More articles in Journal of Policy Modeling from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().