Fiscal transparency and tax ethics: does better information lead to greater compliance?

Salvatore Capasso, Lorenzo Cicatiello, Elina De Simone, Giuseppe Lucio Gaeta and Paulo Mourão

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2021, vol. 43, issue 5, 1031-1050

Abstract: By relying on WVS data and using multilevel mixed modeling, the paper tests the hypothesis that access to larger flows of information about government fiscal accounts and financial transactions increases citizens’ willingness to pay taxes. By supporting such an hypothesis, our analysis suggests that in the presence of more information, the implicit contract between the government and taxpayers displays less stringent incentives and participation constraints and causes part of the contract, namely tax morale, to be enhanced. This finding supports the implementation of fiscal transparency policies, whose possible design is discussed.

Keywords: Tax morale; Fiscal transparency; Tax compliance; Corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 H26 H83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:43:y:2021:i:5:p:1031-1050

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2020.06.003

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