Shall we follow the money? Anti-mafia policies and electoral competition

Livio Ferrante, Francesco Reito, Salvatore Spagano and Gianpiero Torrisi

Journal of Policy Modeling, 2021, vol. 43, issue 5, 1110-1130

Abstract: Building upon the evidence that the mafia increases the degree of vote concentration, we use data on regional elections in Sicily to estimate the impact of anti-mafia policies on electoral competition. We find robust evidence that the reassignment for social purposes of property and assets seized to the mafia reduces the degree of electoral concentration. This result supports the hypothesis that policies that create social value, such as the reallocation to social-driven organizations, are more effective than those targeted to public and political institutions.

Keywords: Elections; Vote concentration; Criminal organizations; Mafia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:43:y:2021:i:5:p:1110-1130

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2021.03.010

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