Pushing towards shared mobility

Roman Zakharenko

Journal of Urban Economics, 2023, vol. 138, issue C

Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical argument for preferential treatment of shared vehicles (SV) over private ones by municipal parking authorities. When all parked vehicles are treated equally, multiple equilibria may exist: (i) a “private” one, in which travellers are hesitant to switch to SV because the latter are hard to find, and (ii) a “shared” equilibrium, in which travellers use shared mobility because the city is saturated with vacant SV. The latter equilibrium, if it exists, is shown to yield higher welfare. Municipal parking discounts for SV reduce the amount of investment required for a “big push” towards the shared equilibrium, or even make it the only equilibrium.

Keywords: Shared mobility; Parking policy; Multiple equilibria; Frictions of space; Repeated matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 L91 R48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juecon:v:138:y:2023:i:c:s0094119023000797

DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2023.103609

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