Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition

Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau and Motohiro Sato

Journal of Urban Economics, 2003, vol. 54, issue 3, 451-458

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Working Paper: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening? A model of tax competition (2003)
Working Paper: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening ? A model of tax competition (2002)
Working Paper: Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juecon:v:54:y:2003:i:3:p:451-458

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