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Interregional competition, spillovers and attachment in a federation

Emilson Silva () and Chikara Yamaguchi

Journal of Urban Economics, 2010, vol. 67, issue 2, 219-225

Abstract: We examine decentralized environmental policy making in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility due to attachment to regions. Energy consumption generates positive consumption benefits, but energy supply generates federal air pollution. Regional authorities regulate energy supply by controlling supplies of pollution permits. Energy and pollution permits are traded in interregional markets. The center redistributes incomes after it observes regional supplies of pollution permits. Regions are populated by mobile and immobile households and profits are expatriated. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the federal policy game played by regional and central authorities is socially optimal.

Keywords: Federation; Interregional; spillovers; Redistribution; Labor; attachment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Interregional Competition, Spillovers and Attachment in a Federation (2003) Downloads
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