Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich

Sam Bucovetsky and Amihai Glazer

Journal of Urban Economics, 2014, vol. 81, issue C, 166-177

Abstract: Using a simple adverse selection model, we characterize equilibrium when the rich chase the poor. If communities are established by competitive entrepreneurs, the equilibrium exists, is unique, and is efficient. It involves either complete separation, or complete pooling. Different income groups may rank these qualitative outcomes differently. We show how restrictions imposed by a central government may alter the nature of equilibrium: such restrictions may be explained as the choice of a low-income majority altering the equilibrium to the pooling outcome which they prefer.

Keywords: Exclusionary policies; Sorting; Decentralization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H73 R23 R38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juecon:v:81:y:2014:i:c:p:166-177

DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2014.03.006

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