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Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America

J. Luis Guasch and Stephane Straub ()

Utilities Policy, 2009, vol. 17, issue 2, 185-190

Abstract: Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions.

Keywords: Renegotiation; Concession; contracts; Regulation; LDCs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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