Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America
J. Luis Guasch and
Stephane Straub ()
Utilities Policy, 2009, vol. 17, issue 2, 185-190
Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions.
Keywords: Renegotiation; Concession; contracts; Regulation; LDCs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:17:y:2009:i:2:p:185-190
Access Statistics for this article
Utilities Policy is currently edited by D. Smith
More articles in Utilities Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().