Electricity and telecoms reforms in the EU: Insights from the economics of federalism

Francesc Trillas

Utilities Policy, 2010, vol. 18, issue 2, 66-76

Abstract: The economics of federalism is a broad discipline with more than five decades of experience. It may shed light on how regulatory jurisdiction is allocated in EU electricity and telecommunications markets. The liberalization of these markets has been accompanied by gradual harmonization of national markets to overcome resistance to competitive forces. Less steps than necessary have been undertaken to promote market integration. Positive and normative reasons remain however for the participation of national or even regional/local powers. Vertical cooperation will remain a necessary condition of a sound regulatory framework, but cooperation may sometimes be inhibited by distributive considerations.

Keywords: Electricity; Federalism; Regulation; Telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957-1787(09)00041-1
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Electricity and telecoms reforms in the EU: Insights from the economics of federalism (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:18:y:2010:i:2:p:66-76

Access Statistics for this article

Utilities Policy is currently edited by Beecher, Janice

More articles in Utilities Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().