Three-part auctions versus self-commitment in day-ahead electricity markets

Ramteen Sioshansi, Shmuel Oren and Richard O'Neill

Utilities Policy, 2010, vol. 18, issue 4, 165-173

Abstract: We examine the economic consequences of a bid-based security-constrained centralized unit commitment paradigm based on three-part offers, which is the prevalent day-ahead market-clearing mechanism in restructured electricity markets in the United States. We then compare this approach with an energy-only auction with self-commitment (such as in Australia) addressing efficiency and pricing as well as the tradeoff between coordination losses and incentives to bid truthfully.

Keywords: Day-ahead; electricity; market; Centralized; market; Unit; commitment; Self-commitment; Combinatorial; auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:165-173

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