The British utility regulation model: Its recent history and future prospects

Jon Stern

Utilities Policy, 2014, vol. 31, issue C, 162-172

Abstract: This paper considers the evolution of the British model of independent utility regulation from the publication of the 1983 Littlechild Report on telecom regulation. Over the last ten years, the model has faced some threats to its pro-competition emphasis, notably in energy regulation and particularly in electricity. These threats have arisen since 2008 and the onset of the Great Recession. However, with the partial exception of energy, challenges to the independence of regulators and to the role of competition have not been acute. The model seems to have generally been able successfully to meet the challenges faced and, relative to other countries, remains intact, if less distinctive. The main continuing issue is how best to handle repeat price-setting regulatory reviews where new initiatives have been tried but have not as yet reached a settled framework within which to handle the underlying strategic gaming problems.

Keywords: Incentive regulation; Competition and regulation; Strategic gaming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K23 L14 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:31:y:2014:i:c:p:162-172

DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2014.09.005

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