A study of the negotiated-settlement practice in regulation: Some evidence from Florida
Shourjo Chakravorty ()
Utilities Policy, 2015, vol. 32, issue C, 12-18
Negotiated settlements have become a frequently used alternative to contested proceedings when setting prices charged by public utilities under the US rate-of-return regulatory model. The behavior of the representatives of consumer advocates and the firms during settlement negotiations determine customer prices. This paper examines this behavior by using data from the Florida Public Service Commission to estimate the payoff functions of both parties. The estimation suggests that the advocate and the firm weight the present rate change more than the consumer's future average price and the firm's future operating revenue in their settlement decisions. It also indicates that the time saved by settlements is not a primary reason for their popularity.
Keywords: Negotiated settlement; Rate-of-return regulation; Stipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L97 L94 L95 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:32:y:2015:i:c:p:12-18
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