Network unbundling and flawed coordination: Experience from the electricity sector
Utilities Policy, 2015, vol. 34, issue C, 11-18
What is a good balance between competition and coordination? On the upside, unbundling in network industries promotes competition, but this should be balanced against the downside of unbundling, that is, the cost of coordination. Firm-internal coordination falls away and must be replaced by external market mechanisms. This is a non-trivial task. The cost of flawed coordination resulting from fragmentation can be substantial and policy should focus more on market mechanisms and governance structures to secure better coordination. This paper examines the problem of coordination and discusses with real-world examples why the market faces difficulty in providing effective coordination.
Keywords: Electricity; Networks; Unbundling; Coordination; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L51 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:34:y:2015:i:c:p:11-18
Access Statistics for this article
Utilities Policy is currently edited by D. Smith
More articles in Utilities Policy from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Haili He ().