 Internal governance and member investment behavior in energy cooperatives: An experimental approachHanna-Helena Höfer and Jens Rommel Utilities Policy, 2015, vol. 36, issue C, 52-56 Abstract: Cooperatives may become increasingly important as suppliers of electricity from renewable resources. Numerous governance models exist for establishing a renewable energy cooperative. Since members self-select into the organization, causal links between methods of internal governance and member characteristics are difficult to identify. We demonstrate how economic experiments can address this problem. In a simple social-dilemma game, we study the impact of heterogeneity in wealth on investment in a jointly owned enterprise under two different governance models. We do not find that member heterogeneity or governance model affect investment levels. A participant's endowment appears to be the most important factor explaining variation in investment. Good knowledge of cooperative governance has a positive impact on investment in the game and good knowledge of game theory has a negative impact on investment in the game. Future research should investigate the effect of the distribution of control rights on the performance of cooperative enterprises. Keywords: Energy transition; Germany; Land-use conflicts and governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:36:y:2015:i:c:p:52-56 DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2015.09.003 Access Statistics for this article Utilities Policy is currently edited by Beecher, Janice More articles in Utilities Policy from Elsevier |
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