Incentives for cost reduction and cost padding in electricity markets with overlapping “green” regulations
Utilities Policy, 2016, vol. 38, issue C, 72-75
We examine overlapping regulations in electricity markets. Using an example based on a stylized model of a competitive energy market, we study cost-reduction and cost-padding incentives by “green-energy” producers in an electricity market employing an emissions tax and the simultaneous use of a green quota for the generation portfolio and a fair rate-of-return constraint implemented via a system of feed-in tariffs. We show inter alia that when subsidies are phased out, exploitation of the green technologies full cost-reduction potential is a Nash Equilibrium but emissions will increase. In addition, green-energy producers can engage in collusive cost padding to increase profits even as they satisfy the policymaker's desired green quota.
Keywords: Renewable energy; Feed-in-tariff; Cost padding; Incentives; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q48 Q58 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:juipol:v:38:y:2016:i:c:p:72-75
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